Rosa Pink Fox
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- Posted: Sat, 18 Nov 2006 05:19:08 +0000
*Note well* Please read the entire first post before posting, to avoid looking like an idiot when I refer you back to my original post to refute your claim. I understand that this post contains complex and dense language and ideas that may be difficult to understand. If you don't not understand, please PM me and I will do what I can to answer any questions. This may require some knowledge of logic and philosophy. Also, inflammatory posts and well as posts of admiration and worship are not necessary in the thread, as they distract from the discussion at hand.
I am attempting to disprove God, defined as the perfect being. Omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevelent, all loving, etc. I will provide a full definition if I find it necessary. This is not necessarily the Judeo-Christian-Muslim God as described in the various religious texts.
Let us begin the discussion with the ontological argument.
1.God exists in understanding.
2.God might have existed in reality. (God is a possible object)
3.If something exists in understanding and might have existed in reality, then it might have been greater than it really is.
4.Suppose God exists only in understanding.
5.God might have been greater than he really is.
6.God is a being of which no greater being can be conceived
7.A being of which no greater being can be conceived might have been greater than he really is.
8.It is false that God exists only in understanding.
9.God exists in reality as well as in understanding.
Some notes for understanding:
Possible thing refers to any object that is logically possible. Logical possibilities are those things that are not self-contradictory. For example an object that is simultaneously a square and a circle is not a possible object because the definition of square contradicts the definition of circle.
St Anslem concedes that impossible objects cannot exist in reality, only as concepts, or only in the understanding.
There are many criticisms against this argument, and the strongest maybe the fact that the argument as it stands is circular, as it presupposes its conclusion as one of the premises. It's a long confusing explanation and if you are really curious I could email it to you.
My criticism, however, is against premise 2 that presupposes that God is a possible object. Consider the ontological argument with the words "an island greater than which none can be conceived" in place of God. It appears we can prove that such an island really exists, but we know that such an island does not exist. If we pretend the flaw is not with the invalid structure of the argument we can find a flaw with premises 2. Is "an island greater than which none can be conceived" a possible object? Well consider such an island. How large would such an island be (let us assume, for the sake of simplification, that largeness is a great-making quality)? Once be gin to imagine how large such an island would be, immediately a larger one appears in our mind. Given that it is logically possible for an island to be infinitely large, it seems we cannot arrive at an "an island greater than which none can be conceived" because we could continue to conceive of greater islands. Here is my first argument.
1. Object X* has one or more measurable, great-making qualities.
2. The object "an X greater than which none can be conceived" has the greatest possible values for these measurable qualities.
3. However, as it is possible for numbers to continue to infinity, it would be possible for these values to continue to infinity.
4. Therefore the object "an X greater than which none can be conceived" is not a possible object.
*Object X is a possible object.
Let us take St Anslem's definition of God as given in premise 6.
1. Beings have one or more measurable, great-making qualities.
2. God has the greatest possible values for these measurable qualities.
3. However, as it is possible for numbers to continue to infinity, it would be possible for these values to continue to infinity.
4. Therefore God is not a possible object.
Perhaps one could object to premise 2, that God's attributes are not measurable. Certainly not in reality, but hypothetically God has attributes that can be measured. Considered omnipotence, or "all-powerful". Power is a measurable attribute, as one could take two people and determine from them that one is more powerful than the other. Since power is measurable, what would it mean to be "all powerful" or "perfectly powerful"? It certainly wouldn't mean "Infinitely powerful" since the former two imply an upper limit while the latter implies limitless.
Try and prove me wrong. domokun
I am attempting to disprove God, defined as the perfect being. Omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevelent, all loving, etc. I will provide a full definition if I find it necessary. This is not necessarily the Judeo-Christian-Muslim God as described in the various religious texts.
Let us begin the discussion with the ontological argument.
1.God exists in understanding.
2.God might have existed in reality. (God is a possible object)
3.If something exists in understanding and might have existed in reality, then it might have been greater than it really is.
4.Suppose God exists only in understanding.
5.God might have been greater than he really is.
6.God is a being of which no greater being can be conceived
7.A being of which no greater being can be conceived might have been greater than he really is.
8.It is false that God exists only in understanding.
9.God exists in reality as well as in understanding.
Some notes for understanding:
Possible thing refers to any object that is logically possible. Logical possibilities are those things that are not self-contradictory. For example an object that is simultaneously a square and a circle is not a possible object because the definition of square contradicts the definition of circle.
St Anslem concedes that impossible objects cannot exist in reality, only as concepts, or only in the understanding.
There are many criticisms against this argument, and the strongest maybe the fact that the argument as it stands is circular, as it presupposes its conclusion as one of the premises. It's a long confusing explanation and if you are really curious I could email it to you.
My criticism, however, is against premise 2 that presupposes that God is a possible object. Consider the ontological argument with the words "an island greater than which none can be conceived" in place of God. It appears we can prove that such an island really exists, but we know that such an island does not exist. If we pretend the flaw is not with the invalid structure of the argument we can find a flaw with premises 2. Is "an island greater than which none can be conceived" a possible object? Well consider such an island. How large would such an island be (let us assume, for the sake of simplification, that largeness is a great-making quality)? Once be gin to imagine how large such an island would be, immediately a larger one appears in our mind. Given that it is logically possible for an island to be infinitely large, it seems we cannot arrive at an "an island greater than which none can be conceived" because we could continue to conceive of greater islands. Here is my first argument.
1. Object X* has one or more measurable, great-making qualities.
2. The object "an X greater than which none can be conceived" has the greatest possible values for these measurable qualities.
3. However, as it is possible for numbers to continue to infinity, it would be possible for these values to continue to infinity.
4. Therefore the object "an X greater than which none can be conceived" is not a possible object.
*Object X is a possible object.
Let us take St Anslem's definition of God as given in premise 6.
1. Beings have one or more measurable, great-making qualities.
2. God has the greatest possible values for these measurable qualities.
3. However, as it is possible for numbers to continue to infinity, it would be possible for these values to continue to infinity.
4. Therefore God is not a possible object.
Perhaps one could object to premise 2, that God's attributes are not measurable. Certainly not in reality, but hypothetically God has attributes that can be measured. Considered omnipotence, or "all-powerful". Power is a measurable attribute, as one could take two people and determine from them that one is more powerful than the other. Since power is measurable, what would it mean to be "all powerful" or "perfectly powerful"? It certainly wouldn't mean "Infinitely powerful" since the former two imply an upper limit while the latter implies limitless.
Try and prove me wrong. domokun
