I've decided to start with a relatively old battle. In the US Civil War, the first really modern war tactics were developed as a result of new technology, such as rifled barrels and dependable artillery. This particular series of posts will be about the Battle of Antietam. But first, a little backround...
The Battle of Antietam (September 17, 1862) took place near Sharpsburg, Maryland and Antietam Creek. It was the first major battle in the American Civil War to take place on Northern soil. It was the bloodiest single-day battle in American history (To that point... More later), with almost 23,000 casualties.
After pursuing Confederate General Robert E. Lee into Maryland, Union Army Major General George B. McClellan launched attacks against Lee's army, in defensive positions behind Antietam Creek. Despite having superiority of numbers, McClellan's attack failed to achieve concentration of mass, resulting in a three-phase battle that Lee was able to counter by shifting forces to meet each challenge. Despite ample reserve forces that could have been deployed to exploit localized successes, McClellan failed to destroy Lee's army. (For those who aren't familiar with their Civil War generals, McClellan was always a rather talented general, but he was also always overly-cautious in battles, allowing his enemies to gather strength, build defenses, or counter-attack. Also more on that later.)
Map of intial troop positions!NUMBERS:
Lee (CSA Forces): 45,000
McClellan (USA Forces): 87,000
OBVIOUS ADVANTAGEUnion soldiers (Corporal Barton W. Mitchell and First Sergeant John M. Bloss of the 27th Indiana Volunteer Infantry) discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed battle plans of Lee's army—Special Order 191—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically (to Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, and Hagerstown, Maryland), thus making each subject to isolation and defeat in detail if McClellan could move quickly enough. McClellan waited about 18 hours before deciding to take advantage of this intelligence and position his forces based on it, thus squandering a golden opportunity to defeat Lee decisively. Lee got word that his plans were known beforehand, and moved his few troops into a defensive position behind the creek. it was good for keeping his infantry safe, but the creek could be easily overcome and the only retreat route was a single bridge accross the Potomac River. At this point, only 18,000 of Lee's total amount of men were present.
The first two Union divisions arrived on the afternoon of September 15 and the bulk of the remainder of the army late that evening. Although an immediate Union attack on the morning of September 16 would have had an overwhelming advantage in numbers, McClellan's trademark caution and his belief that Lee had over 100,000 men, caused him to delay his attack for a day. During this time, Gen. Longtreet and Gen. Stonewall Jackson arrived, using their men to help defend the N & S flanks.
On the evening of the 16th, McClellan finally ordered Maj. Gen. John Hooker to cross the creek and Brig. Gen George Meade's division cautiously attacked the Confederates near the East Woods. After darkness, artillery fire continued as McClellan continued to position his troops. McClellan's plan was to overwhelm the enemy's left flank. He hoped to use the positions of nearby bridges dominated by CSA troops. McClellan planned to commit more than half of his army to the assault, starting with two corps, supported by a third, and if necessary a fourth. Simultaneously, he intended to launch a diversionary attack against the Confederate right with a fifth corps, and was prepared to strike the center with his reserves if either attack succeeded. Unfortunately, Lee was no moron. The skirmish in the East Woods served to signal McClellan's intentions to Lee, who prepared his defenses accordingly. He shifted men to his left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet arrived on the battlefield.
McClellan's plans were ill-coordinated and would be executed poorly. He issued to each of his subordinate commanders only the orders for his own corps, not general orders describing the entire battle plan. The terrain of the battlefield made it difficult for those commanders to monitor events outside of their sectors and McClellan's headquarters were more than a mile in the rear. (COMMUNICATION!) Therefore, the battle progressed the next day as essentially three separate, mostly uncoordinated battles: morning in the northern end of the battlefield, mid-day in the center, and afternoon in the south.
This lack of coordination and concentration of McClellan's forces almost completely nullified the two-to-one advantage the Union enjoyed and allowed Lee to shift his defensive forces to parry each thrust.The Next Morning: 17thThe battle opened around 5:30 a.m with an attack by the Union I Corps under Joe Hooker. Hooker's objective was the plateau on which the Dunker Church sat, a modest whitewashed building belonging to a local sect of German Baptists. Hooker had approximately 8,600 men, little more than the 7,700 defenders under Stonewall Jackson, and this slight disparity was more than offset by the Confederates' strong defensive positions.
As the first Union men emerged from the North Woods and into the Cornfield, an artillery duel erupted. Confederate fire was from the horse artillery batteries under Jeb Stuart to the west and four batteries under Col. Stephen D. Lee on the high ground across the pike from the Dunker Church to the south. Union return fire was from nine batteries on the ridge behind the North Woods and four batteries of 20-pounder Parrott rifles, 2 miles east of Antietam Creek. The conflagration caused heavy casualties on both sides and was described by Col. Lee as "artillery Hell." Seeing the glint of Confederate bayonets concealed in the Cornfield, Hooker halted his infantry and brought up four batteries of artillery, which fired shell and canister over the heads of the Federal infantry, covering the field. The artillery and rifle fire from both sides acted like a scythe, cutting down cornstalks and men alike. However, the CSA quickly recovered and USA troops were forced back, aided by Lee's artillery fire. The reinforcements that the US forces had expected, brigades under Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff and Col. William A. Christian, had difficulties reaching the scene. Hartsuff was wounded by a shell and Christian dismounted and fled to the rear in terror. As the superior Union numbers began to tell, the Louisiana "Tiger" Brigade under Harry Hays entered the fray and forced the Union men back to the East Woods. (The casualties received by the 12th Massachusetts infantry, 67%, were the highest of any unit that day.) The Tigers were beaten back eventually when the Federals brought up a battery of 3-inch ordnance rifles and rolled them directly into the Cornfield, point-blank fire that slaughtered the Tigers, who lost 323 of their 500 men.
Federal advances a few hundred yards to the west were more successful. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's 4th Brigade of Doubleday's division (recently named the Iron Brigade) advanced down the turnpike, pushing aside Jackson's men. They were halted by a charge of 1,150 men. However, the leader of the charge was mortally wounded and the Confederate brigade withdrew. A large gap was now torn in Jackson's defensive line, which teetered near collapse. Although the cost was steep, Hooker's corps was making steady progress.
Fortunately for the Confederates, reinforcements were arriving. Just after 7 a.m., the divisions under McLaws and Richard H. Anderson arrived following a night march from Harpers Ferry. Around 7:15, General Lee moved George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade from the right flank of the army to aid Jackson.
At 7 a.m., Hood's division of 2,300 men advanced through the West Woods and pushed the Union troops back through the Cornfield again. (The Texans attacked with particular ferocity because as they were called from their reserve position they were forced to interrupt the first hot breakfast they had had in days.) They were aided by three brigades of D.H. Hill's division arriving from the Mumma Farm, southeast of the Cornfield, and by Jubal Early's brigade, pushing through the West Woods from the Nicodemus Farm, where they had been supporting Jeb Stuart's horse artillery. Hood's men bore the brunt of the fighting, however, and paid a heavy price—60% casualties—but they were able to prevent the defensive line from crumbling and held off the I Corps. When asked by a fellow officer where his division was, Hood replied, "Dead on the field."
Hooker's men had also paid heavily, but without achieving their objectives. After two hours and 2,500 casualties, they were back where they started. The Cornfield, an area no more than 250 yards deep than 400 yards wide, was a scene of indescribable destruction. Hooker's report stated: "... every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the [Confederates] slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before." It was estimated that the Cornfield changed hands no fewer than 15 times in the course of the morning. Hooker called for support from the 7,200 men of Mansfield's XII Corps.
That's all for now! I congratulate any of you who read this entirely!
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