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Broorel

PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 3:58 am


I just read an interesting article http://www.vanderbilt.edu/SFL/peter_kreeft_--_personhood_begins_at_conception.htm#BeforeReading
regarding the misconception that functionalism defines personhood. This article had a slight Christian slant(it was addressing the Christian medical and dental field) but the anti-functionalism argument is largly secular.

I found it very interesting because it put into words the concept that I so often am unable to. Basically, when we define personhood by what we can "do" we inhearantly miss the point of who we "are". Often the pro-life rebutal to a list of "person-hood qualifications" is "well, what about x-group they do not meet this list". This is often rebutued by stating that a "person" must meet only ONE of these functions to be deamed a "person".
Unfortunatly by defining our essance as mere functionalism, we ignore that humans do in fact posess an essance unique to humans. If a robot could replecate all "person" functions, would they then be people? No, because there is something inhearant that seperates our being with our function.

Anyways, I've been up all night so I dont know how much sense thsi makes, I'll expound on this if there is any interest smile
PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 7:12 am


Broorel
If a robot could replecate all "person" functions, would they then be people? No, because there is something inhearant that seperates our being with our function.
I don't have the time to read the article right now ^_^; I've got class in a few minutes.

But I was talking with some other people (who are completely unrelated to the abortion debate... they're in a guild I go to)... and this topic came up.

If a robot could be demonstratably sentient (and could pass the problem presented by the "chineese room" ), as well as a few other things (ie if it was like a human in every way except the biological part, and consequentially the physical sensation part) I'd consider it a person... or at least argue that if not call it a person, it ought to have all the rights that we grant human adults.

What I thought was another interesting question: If we could take a human mind... and transport it into a computer somehow... where there would be no difference between the mind in the body and the mind in the computer (a very sci-fi concept, I'm sure you know what I mean right?)... would you lose your status as personhood because you now lack a physical body, but are housed within a computer?

Or like the animorphs (I assume some of you had to have read them XD)... when they turn into animals, are they no longer "human" in mind? Would they not be persons anymore?

Granted it's sci-fi and won't ever happen in the real world... but it's related, no?

Talon-chan


Tiger of the Fire

PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 8:17 am


Quote:
If a robot could be demonstratably sentient (and could pass the problem presented by the "chineese room" ), as well as a few other things (ie if it was like a human in every way except the biological part, and consequentially the physical sensation part) I'd consider it a person... or at least argue that if not call it a person, it ought to have all the rights that we grant human adults.
I can't help but think of Star Trek's Data (my God I love him eek any one see the episode where he created a daughter...it was so sad crying ) or the movie/book I Robot on this one. I agree whole heartedly to an extent. Data and Sunny where andorids with learning AI, they come of their self awareness of their own will.

Quote:
What I thought was another interesting question: If we could take a human mind... and transport it into a computer somehow... where there would be no difference between the mind in the body and the mind in the computer (a very sci-fi concept, I'm sure you know what I mean right?)... would you lose your status as personhood because you now lack a physical body, but are housed within a computer?
You shoudl see the anime Ghost in the Shell for that one. Or the two series it sprouted. Very interesting.

Quote:
Or like the animorphs (I assume some of you had to have read them XD)... when they turn into animals, are they no longer "human" in mind? Would they not be persons anymore?
They think like humans and act like humans, and they are humans, but they can change ito animals. I really don't see why their humanity and personhood would be stripped for this.
PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 8:18 am


Broorel
I just read an interesting article http://www.vanderbilt.edu/SFL/peter_kreeft_--_personhood_begins_at_conception.htm#BeforeReading
regarding the misconception that functionalism defines personhood. This article had a slight Christian slant(it was addressing the Christian medical and dental field) but the anti-functionalism argument is largly secular.

I found it very interesting because it put into words the concept that I so often am unable to. Basically, when we define personhood by what we can "do" we inhearantly miss the point of who we "are". Often the pro-life rebutal to a list of "person-hood qualifications" is "well, what about x-group they do not meet this list". This is often rebutued by stating that a "person" must meet only ONE of these functions to be deamed a "person".
Unfortunatly by defining our essance as mere functionalism, we ignore that humans do in fact posess an essance unique to humans. If a robot could replecate all "person" functions, would they then be people? No, because there is something inhearant that seperates our being with our function.

Anyways, I've been up all night so I dont know how much sense thsi makes, I'll expound on this if there is any interest smile
The thing that would make a robot different from a human, even if it had all the functions, is our relationship with nature.
I've been reading a book called, "What is Nature?" and if you get around all the words Soper uses you come to realise that humans are distinct from nature but also a part of it. A robot is not because it's technology and is created by humans, not as a tool, but simply to be created, while an unborn child has that relation to nature, in its purest form, as well as the functions that make it human.

P.S. I'll read the article later. I have Philosophy soon... sweatdrop

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PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 12:04 pm


Talon-chan
Broorel
If a robot could replecate all "person" functions, would they then be people? No, because there is something inhearant that seperates our being with our function.
I don't have the time to read the article right now ^_^; I've got class in a few minutes.

But I was talking with some other people (who are completely unrelated to the abortion debate... they're in a guild I go to)... and this topic came up.

If a robot could be demonstratably sentient (and could pass the problem presented by the "chineese room" ), as well as a few other things (ie if it was like a human in every way except the biological part, and consequentially the physical sensation part) I'd consider it a person... or at least argue that if not call it a person, it ought to have all the rights that we grant human adults.

What I thought was another interesting question: If we could take a human mind... and transport it into a computer somehow... where there would be no difference between the mind in the body and the mind in the computer (a very sci-fi concept, I'm sure you know what I mean right?)... would you lose your status as personhood because you now lack a physical body, but are housed within a computer?

Or like the animorphs (I assume some of you had to have read them XD)... when they turn into animals, are they no longer "human" in mind? Would they not be persons anymore?

Granted it's sci-fi and won't ever happen in the real world... but it's related, no?
Good points, I think, and I agree. If a robot became sentient, self aware, all the things that make humans humans, then I would say it would be deserving of the same rights as humans.

Because who are we to judge the "essence"? Who says that the robots wouldn't also have it?

As far as the Animorphs; Their physical body changes, but their, I don't know, spiritual being doesn't, though it sometimes has to fight with the instincts of the body.
PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 1:31 pm


I'd have to agree with everyone else on the robot thing, but that's because I'm addicted to Star Trek xd

But the point is that functionallity alone does not make us people. There is something else. Y'all say sentience, but even animals have sentience. That doesn't make them people. There is something more to it.

lymelady
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Penguin Spoon

PostPosted: Tue Feb 07, 2006 6:33 pm


I think the issue about the whole what can humans "do" is not really about if a robot can actually BECOME what humans are, but what it can replicate. If a robot is able to simulate emotions, simulate thought, and simulate self awareness does it become what humans essentially are? There is a tricky line between what we are and what we do, and I think the idea of a human simulation robot is not as cut and dried as a robot that genuinely IS a freethinking creature. What if we were to create a program that effectively took into account any possibilty of inputs. Not creating an entity that can understand new concepts and react to them in the way that animals do, but a program that has every foreseeable "situation" programed into it ahead of time. This program would have the semblence of rationality and essentially would exhibit the same functionality of humans in regards to "thinking." However, the actual essence of the program would not be the same of humans in the idea that humans are beings that can rationalize any situation based on our nature, not on foresight, whereas a program with infinite foresight like I suggested would be only have the semblence of such a nature. Whereas this program would have essentially already "experienced" anything it possibly could and have a stock answer, humanity is able to expand their scope of experience by developing new answers.

The problem is that this computer is essentially DOING what humans can do, but it is not human - it is only a vast program. What it is is much different than what it can do. If we assign humanity based on what we can acomplish then we are missing the key essence of what it is to be human....which is to BE a creature capable of expanding its scope of experience. A fetus is capable of this as well as any human is by nature of being a human. Of course, the brain dead (assuming 100% for sure) and human corpses(also assuming 100% for sure!) do not apply because they are no longer capable of expanding their experience.

Personally, I believe that human rights are not earned individually anyways....as based on functionality OR on what they are in essense. I havent thought it out enough to really harp on it, but I believe human rights are extend to all living humans as nature of being alive and of being a part of humanity because humanity is capable of collective "betterment." All humans, no matter what their relationship to collective humanity are extended rights earned by humanity by the same token that the social contract extends rights to all humans in a society no matter what their input and relationship to the society is. I havent fleshed it out, or articulated it very well, but I have to believe that this is how we assign human rights otherwise I find it difficult to discern between animals who are capable of individual higher thinking (and incapable of collective "betterment") and the mentally handicapped and senile elderly and newly born infants. If we set the prerequisite to thinking, reasoning, emotivity, or self-awareness I find it that we are either exluding groups like the senile and infants from full human rights or we are including certain animals with full human rights.
PostPosted: Sat Feb 18, 2006 6:48 am


Basing rights on functionallity doesn't make sense to me. That's like saying my father is more of a person than my mother because my mother's in a wheelchair. Basing it on age doesn't make sense either, because that would mean my mother's more of a person than my father because she's older.

lymelady
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Talon-chan

PostPosted: Sat Feb 18, 2006 7:38 am


lymelady
Basing rights on functionallity doesn't make sense to me. That's like saying my father is more of a person than my mother because my mother's in a wheelchair. Basing it on age doesn't make sense either, because that would mean my mother's more of a person than my father because she's older.
Why does personhood have to be a gradient or transitional? Why not a quick clean break, either you are a person 100% or you aren't a person 100%?

You're thinking of personhood as a transitional thing based on functions... sorta like how a teenager is not a child or an adult, but he or she becomes more of an adult with time (an 17 year old is more of an adult than a 14 year old) and ability (one who can drive and is able to hold a job is more of an adult than one who cannot, some might argue).

Why not think of it as something you acquire in its entirety at a specific point in time or at a specific ability? For example, in the US you become a citizen age 18. You don't have more citizenship at 45 than you do at 18. You aren't more of a citizen because you vote at 18 but choose not to at 45. At both 18 and 45 you are equally considered citizens, but the ability to vote (one could argue since some 17 year olds can vote in an election if they turn 18 before december 31st that year) or the time at which you turn 18 you become a citizen whereas before then you are not.

So why not think of personhood that way? Your mom and dad are both equally 100% persons because they've acquired whatever it is one might argue makes a person.
PostPosted: Sat Feb 18, 2006 9:25 am


Talon-chan
lymelady
Basing rights on functionallity doesn't make sense to me. That's like saying my father is more of a person than my mother because my mother's in a wheelchair. Basing it on age doesn't make sense either, because that would mean my mother's more of a person than my father because she's older.
Why does personhood have to be a gradient or transitional? Why not a quick clean break, either you are a person 100% or you aren't a person 100%?

You're thinking of personhood as a transitional thing based on functions... sorta like how a teenager is not a child or an adult, but he or she becomes more of an adult with time (an 17 year old is more of an adult than a 14 year old) and ability (one who can drive and is able to hold a job is more of an adult than one who cannot, some might argue).

Why not think of it as something you acquire in its entirety at a specific point in time or at a specific ability? For example, in the US you become a citizen age 18. You don't have more citizenship at 45 than you do at 18. You aren't more of a citizen because you vote at 18 but choose not to at 45. At both 18 and 45 you are equally considered citizens, but the ability to vote (one could argue since some 17 year olds can vote in an election if they turn 18 before december 31st that year) or the time at which you turn 18 you become a citizen whereas before then you are not.

So why not think of personhood that way? Your mom and dad are both equally 100% persons because they've acquired whatever it is one might argue makes a person.
o.O I'm fairly certain you have citizenship from birth, and you only gain legal adulthood at 18.

Anyways, it's only legal adulthood. Basically, they had to decide some age when most people are mature enough to make certain decisions for themselves and the country. However, no one would deny that some people are more mature then others, and some people gain that level of maturity earlier or later. I like to think I was mature enough to vote in the last election, and I'm certain I was more mature then some of the people who were able to vote. But because of the legal voting age, I wasn't an adult? Give me a break.

And I'm pretty sure she's arguing the requirements for human-hood; One might argue biped and walks/acts/looks like a human, and the Pro-Choice side certainly argues age.

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PostPosted: Sat Feb 18, 2006 3:59 pm


Talon-chan
lymelady
Basing rights on functionallity doesn't make sense to me. That's like saying my father is more of a person than my mother because my mother's in a wheelchair. Basing it on age doesn't make sense either, because that would mean my mother's more of a person than my father because she's older.
Why does personhood have to be a gradient or transitional? Why not a quick clean break, either you are a person 100% or you aren't a person 100%?

You're thinking of personhood as a transitional thing based on functions... sorta like how a teenager is not a child or an adult, but he or she becomes more of an adult with time (an 17 year old is more of an adult than a 14 year old) and ability (one who can drive and is able to hold a job is more of an adult than one who cannot, some might argue).

Why not think of it as something you acquire in its entirety at a specific point in time or at a specific ability? For example, in the US you become a citizen age 18. You don't have more citizenship at 45 than you do at 18. You aren't more of a citizen because you vote at 18 but choose not to at 45. At both 18 and 45 you are equally considered citizens, but the ability to vote (one could argue since some 17 year olds can vote in an election if they turn 18 before december 31st that year) or the time at which you turn 18 you become a citizen whereas before then you are not.

So why not think of personhood that way? Your mom and dad are both equally 100% persons because they've acquired whatever it is one might argue makes a person.


First, I think she was arguing *against* functionalism. This line of thinking isn't technically functionalism, but anyways...
If you're going to draw a definite starting point at which one becomes a person, wouldn't it make the most scientific sense to have personhood begin when you first start growing from a combination of sex cells?
PostPosted: Sat Feb 18, 2006 5:21 pm


La Veuve Zin
Talon-chan
lymelady
Basing rights on functionallity doesn't make sense to me. That's like saying my father is more of a person than my mother because my mother's in a wheelchair. Basing it on age doesn't make sense either, because that would mean my mother's more of a person than my father because she's older.
Why does personhood have to be a gradient or transitional? Why not a quick clean break, either you are a person 100% or you aren't a person 100%?

You're thinking of personhood as a transitional thing based on functions... sorta like how a teenager is not a child or an adult, but he or she becomes more of an adult with time (an 17 year old is more of an adult than a 14 year old) and ability (one who can drive and is able to hold a job is more of an adult than one who cannot, some might argue).

Why not think of it as something you acquire in its entirety at a specific point in time or at a specific ability? For example, in the US you become a citizen age 18. You don't have more citizenship at 45 than you do at 18. You aren't more of a citizen because you vote at 18 but choose not to at 45. At both 18 and 45 you are equally considered citizens, but the ability to vote (one could argue since some 17 year olds can vote in an election if they turn 18 before december 31st that year) or the time at which you turn 18 you become a citizen whereas before then you are not.

So why not think of personhood that way? Your mom and dad are both equally 100% persons because they've acquired whatever it is one might argue makes a person.


First, I think she was arguing *against* functionalism. This line of thinking isn't technically functionalism, but anyways...
If you're going to draw a definite starting point at which one becomes a person, wouldn't it make the most scientific sense to have personhood begin when you first start growing from a combination of sex cells?


That woud be the most logical conclusion, biologicly. Philospoicly and with your own opinoin you can draw the lien anywhere

Tiger of the Fire


Talon-chan

PostPosted: Sun Feb 19, 2006 4:49 pm


La Veuve Zin

First, I think she was arguing *against* functionalism. This line of thinking isn't technically functionalism, but anyways...
If you're going to draw a definite starting point at which one becomes a person, wouldn't it make the most scientific sense to have personhood begin when you first start growing from a combination of sex cells?
I would say conception is the defining point of human-ness. Without a doubt at conception a zygote is human. If I wanted to be uber precautious I would then say that that is what determines personhood as well. However, obviously, I don't personally believe that ^_^;;

If one wants to define when personhood begins, one must first define what personhood is and what personhood entails. Only after that can you make an argument for where personhood can be scientifically demonstrateable.

I tend to define personhood in terms of negatives, via what isn't a person (ie animals are not persons, thus what makes us different from them?), instead of the positive, via what a person is (people are human genetically).

One could argue that personhood is defined as having a conscious understanding of the fact you will one day die as well as a conscious understanding of morality and that without such things you are no better than an animal and thus not a person. Michael Tooley takes this stance in a really interesting essay I once read. He argued that any child under the age of about 4 probably doesn't have such an ability and thus is not a person. To be truly safe he argued that it is indubitably so before age 2 and that infantcide is thus morally acceptable.

Of course I disagree with him completely... that was just to demonstrate the point that we need to figure out how personhood is defined... or what makes a person a person... before figuring out if a fetus has it and backing that with scientific evidence. Functionality is just one way to define personhood.
PostPosted: Sun Feb 19, 2006 5:03 pm


Talon-chan
La Veuve Zin

First, I think she was arguing *against* functionalism. This line of thinking isn't technically functionalism, but anyways...
If you're going to draw a definite starting point at which one becomes a person, wouldn't it make the most scientific sense to have personhood begin when you first start growing from a combination of sex cells?
I would say conception is the defining point of human-ness. Without a doubt at conception a zygote is human. If I wanted to be uber precautious I would then say that that is what determines personhood as well. However, obviously, I don't personally believe that ^_^;;

If one wants to define when personhood begins, one must first define what personhood is and what personhood entails. Only after that can you make an argument for where personhood can be scientifically demonstrateable.

I tend to define personhood in terms of negatives, via what isn't a person (ie animals are not persons, thus what makes us different from them?), instead of the positive, via what a person is (people are human genetically).

One could argue that personhood is defined as having a conscious understanding of the fact you will one day die as well as a conscious understanding of morality and that without such things you are no better than an animal and thus not a person. Michael Tooley takes this stance in a really interesting essay I once read. He argued that any child under the age of about 4 probably doesn't have such an ability and thus is not a person. To be truly safe he argued that it is indubitably so before age 2 and that infantcide is thus morally acceptable.

Of course I disagree with him completely... that was just to demonstrate the point that we need to figure out how personhood is defined... or what makes a person a person... before figuring out if a fetus has it and backing that with scientific evidence. Functionality is just one way to define personhood.


The problem is, when you define personhood in functional terms you inhearantly deny personhood to specific groups of otherwise recognized people. As you said, there is no argument for personhood that excludes fetuses yet includeds infants. Of course we do not recognized infanticide as an appropriate course of action. There must be something defining our personhood seperate from mere function.

Broorel


Talon-chan

PostPosted: Sun Feb 19, 2006 6:31 pm


Broorel

The problem is, when you define personhood in functional terms you inhearantly deny personhood to specific groups of otherwise recognized people. As you said, there is no argument for personhood that excludes fetuses yet includeds infants. Of course we do not recognized infanticide as an appropriate course of action. There must be something defining our personhood seperate from mere function.
I disagree strongly with the bolded statement.

Aside from that... if we're looking for something other than mere function defining personhood, what do we use? What does it mean to qualify someone as a "person"? What does it mean to point to a man and say "you are a person" and point to a dog and say "you are just an animal"? If we don't define it through functions, then how would you propose we define it?

And would this definition cover all persons you could consider? (I.E. if you believe an intelligent alien race, or an AI like DATA from star trek would be qulified as "persons," then that would need to be covered in your definition too)
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