The topic of this debate is the question of if determinism is compatible with freedom. The philosophical dictionary at
http://philosophypages.com/dy/ defines the two key terms this way:
Determinism
Belief that, since each momentary state of the world entails all of its future states, it must be possible (in principle) to offer a causal explanation for everything that happens. When applied to human behavior, determinism is sometimes supposed to be incompatible with the freedom required for moral responsibility. The most extreme variety of determinism in this context is fatalism.
Freedom {Lat. libertas Ger. Freiheit}}
The human capacity to act (or not to act) as we choose or prefer, without any external compulsion or restraint. Freedom in this sense is usually regarded as a presupposition of moral responsibility: the actions for which I may be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished, are just those which I perform freely. The further question of whether choice, the volition or will to act, is itself free or subject to ordinary causality raises the issue of determinism in human conduct. But most modern philosophers have held that (internal) determination of the will by desire or impulse does not diminish the relevant sense of moral responsibility.
Some philosophers, called compatibilists, believe that freedom can exist within a deterministic universe. (These philosophers need not be determinists themselves -- they only need to believe that if determinism is true then free will remains true.) Others, incompatibilists, believe that if determinisim is true that eliminates the possibility of freedom.
Note that this debate is not about whether determinism is actually true. To approach this question we have to first take it as a given that determinism is true, and work from there to determine what the consequences of this would be for personal freedom. 
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